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ow do we relate human thought processes 
to measurable events in the brain? Mental 
chronometry, which has origins that date back more 
than a century, seeks to measure the time course of mental 
operations in the human nervous system [1]. From the late 
1800s until 1950, the ﬁ  eld was built almost entirely around a 
single method: measuring and comparing people’s reaction 
times during simple cognitive tasks. As far back as 1868, 
Franciscus Donders [2] subtracted the time taken to make a 
single response to an unvarying stimulus—what he called an 
instructed reﬂ  ex—from the time it took to make the same 
response to one of two events, obtaining the time required to 
discriminate between the two stimuli. Further, he subtracted 
the time to discriminate two stimuli from a situation in which 
there were also two possible responses in order to obtain the 
time required for choice. 
In the 1950s, studies of reaction time were combined with 
the then-developing mathematical theory of information [3] 
to address issues such as the maximum transmission rate of 
the human nervous system [4] and how coding in the brain 
of stimuli and their responses could inﬂ  uence these limits 
[5]. These studies revealed that reaction time alone was 
not sufﬁ  cient to elucidate the exact processes by which the 
brain achieved the human ability to process information. 
However, when combined with other methods, the latency of 
responding can help connect brain studies to the behavior of 
humans in real situations. 
Recording the average event-related electrical potentials 
from scalp electrodes became a research tool in the 1960s, 
with the advent of analog and then digital computers to 
accomplish the recording and averaging. It became clear 
that components of the event-related potential could 
be systematically related to sensory and motor stages of 
information processing. For instance, a visual stimulus was 
found to evoke a short-latency scalp response from the 
primary visual cortex at about 60 milliseconds, followed by 
positive and negative voltage changes in neighboring visual 
areas. Similarly, scalp recorded potentials from the frontal 
cortex could be recorded in relation to motor activity. It was 
now possible to observe some of the sensory and motor stages 
that were inferred from Donders’s subtractive method (see 
[6] for a review).
Saul Sternberg [7] developed a much-improved method for 
dividing reaction time into successive or serial stages, called 
the additive factors method. Subjects were asked to determine 
whether or not a probe digit had been present in a just 
previously presented series of digits. Sternberg argued that 
the time to complete the task could be divided into a sensory 
stage, dependent on stimulus parameters such as the intensity 
or clarity of the probe; a comparison stage, dependent only 
on the number of items in memory; and a response stage 
that reﬂ  ected the difﬁ  culty of the speciﬁ  ed response. Factors 
that inﬂ  uenced one stage (e.g., stimulus intensity) would be 
additive with those that inﬂ  uenced another stage (e.g., motor 
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Figure 1. Reaction Time for Various Conditions
People were asked to judge whether a presented digit was greater 
or less than ﬁ  ve. The time to respond (reaction time) varied 
systematically as a function of notation (Arabic digits vs. spelled-
out numbers), distance (closer or farther in sequence from ﬁ  ve), 
and responding hand. The three effects are additive, indicating 
the likelihood of serial stages of cognitive processing. 
(Adapted from [14])PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0205
output). With this simple framework, it was now possible to 
determine at which stage(s) a new factor (e.g., nicotine, sleep 
deprivation, or Parkinson’s disease) had its inﬂ  uence.
In the 1950s, the advent of microelectrode recordings of 
single neurons from anesthetized monkeys allowed for an 
even ﬁ  ner resolution of neurophysiological processes and 
seemed to provide support for the view that the brain does 
indeed process information in serial stages. Hubel and Wiesel 
[8] argued that successive levels of the visual system could 
be seen as accomplishing successive analyses of input. The 
microelectrode strategy was quickly adopted to alert animals, 
making it apparent that higher level brain areas involved 
in operations upon input might feedback their inﬂ  uences 
on earlier processing stages [9,10]. These control systems, 
often called attention, posed something of a problem for 
completely serial views of information processing. However, 
they also provided evidence of localized brain areas within 
the parietal lobe of the monkey that could be systematically 
related to processing operations involved in attention—which 
were then being investigated by mental chronometry in 
patients with parietal and other lesions [11]. 
In the late 1980s, neuroimaging experiments made 
possible the examination of activity in localized brain areas, 
ﬁ  rst through the use of injected radionuclides detected by 
positron emission tomography (PET) [12] and later through 
the use of an externally imposed magnetic ﬁ  eld in functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [13]. Over the last ten 
years, fMRI has improved in spatial and temporal resolution 
and can now provide evidence of quite speciﬁ  c brain areas, 
in the millimeter range, that are involved in cognitive tasks. 
Most studies have shown a small number of widely distributed 
brain areas that must be orchestrated to carry out a cognitive 
task. Although, as in all sciences, there are disagreements, 
the convergence of results in areas of attention and language 
seem to me particularly impressive. 
When the fMRI method for localization is brought together 
with methods that can accurately measure timing of the same 
activity (i.e., electrical or magnetic event-related potentials) 
they can provide considerable insight into the nature of 
thought. Consider the simple task of deciding whether 
a presented digit is above or below ﬁ  ve [14]. Dehaene 
argued that the task could be divided into four stages. 
The ﬁ  rst involves obtaining the identity of the probe input 
(encoding), the second making a comparison against the 
stored representation of the digit ﬁ  ve, the third selecting a 
response, and lastly, checking the output for error. According 
to additive factor theory, a variable that effects overall 
reaction time by varying the time to complete one stage 
will be additive with the effects of variables that affect other 
stages. The input or encoding stage was varied by using either 
Arabic or spelled digits (e.g., “3” or “three”). The comparison 
stage was varied by comparing digits close to ﬁ  ve (e.g., six) 
with those far from ﬁ  ve (e.g., nine). The response stage was 
varied by specifying a response from either the dominant or 
non-dominant hand and error monitoring was examined by 
comparing error with correct trials. Each of these variables 
inﬂ  uenced only the appropriate stage and was additive in its 
effect with each of the other variables (see Figure 1).
Moreover, scalp-recorded, event-related potentials showed 
a separate scalp distribution and latency for each variable 
[14]. Subsequent fMRI data has conﬁ  rmed and increased the 
precision of the anatomy proposed for each of these stages.
Of course, not all human activities involve a set of 
exhaustive and independent serial stages that can be shown 
to add up to the overall reaction time. While tasks like the 
number comparison discussed above can be usefully divided 
into stages, some components may deal with simultaneous 
operations and may be limited only by a total capacity of 
central mechanisms. We know that many situations involve 
parallel processing and feedback loops at many levels. 
Sternberg has attempted to apply a modiﬁ  ed version of 
additive factor theory to brain systems using neuroimaging 
that allows for some of these possibilities [15,16]. 
Laboratory studies often use the simultaneous execution of 
two different tasks (dual tasks) to simulate the more realistic 
situations where humans time-share activities. In this issue 
of PLoS Biology, Sigman and Dehaene [17] provide a model 
that further extends the additive factor logic to the dual task 
situation. They propose that for tasks that can be broken 
down into three consecutive stages—perception, decision 
based on noisy integration of evidence, and response—the 
perceptual and motor stages can operate both simultaneously 
with and independently of stages of another task and are 
thus easily amenable to additive factor analysis. The decision 
stage, however, appears to represent a kind of “cognitive 
bottleneck” for which the reaction times of the two tasks 
become interdependent. The model adds considerably to the 
range of situations to which an additive factor approach can 
be applied, allowing investigators to seek more information 
about how new variables inﬂ  uence hidden processing stages.
Many cognitive and emotional tasks studied with 
neuroimaging have implicated a small number of brain areas 
that are consistently active. Mental chronometry plays a role 
in suggesting the cognitive operations that each of these 
areas performs and how they are organized in real time. The 
toolkit of new techniques provides the basis for further tests 
to evaluate whether a chronometric model reveals a crucial 
set of connected computations (circuit) for carrying out the 
task. For example, using a magnetic pulse delivered outside 
the skull, it is now possible to induce a reversible lesion at the 
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Figure 2. Regions of the Brain Involved in a Number Comparison Task 
Derived from EEG and fMRI Studies
The regions represented correspond to those showing effects 
of notation used for the numbers (pink and hatched), distance 
from the test number (orange), choice of hand (red), and errors 
(purple).
(Illustration: Giovanni Maki; adapted from [18])PLoS Biology  |  www.plosbiology.org 0206
time of a particular computation to determine whether the 
speciﬁ  c computation assigned to a given area is truly needed 
to carry out the task. Studies using diffusion tensor imaging 
can examine whether there are large-scale connections 
between neural areas posited by a particular model. In 
describing the links between brain and behavior, mental 
chronometry is still a cornerstone that binds psychology to 
the techniques of neuroscience.  
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